Re-trial
休班警港鐵非禮女客判囚
27/09/2008
【本報訊】二十九歲休班警員涉在港鐵列車上用下體頂壓一女乘客臀部非禮，案件在九龍城法院經重審後，被告昨再被裁定非禮罪成判囚二十一日。裁判官判刑時指，被告利用鐵路在繁忙時間的擠迫情況去非禮其他女乘客，案情非常嚴重，必須判囚以反映案件的嚴重性。
被告區智樑再次被定罪及判囚後，仍然不服打算再上訴，獲准以五萬元保釋等候上訴。辯方求情指，被告十七歲便進入警察學堂受訓，從小志願是做警察，因短短三分鐘的案發情況便令他前途盡毀，對他已是很大懲罰。
裁判官指，控方證人誠實可靠，雖然控方舉證只能證明被告用身體其中一部分觸碰女事主，未能確實該部位是陽具；但認為被告當時心存猥褻及敵意侵犯事主，故裁定罪成。
案發○六年九月十四日，被告被指在一列由金鐘開往荃灣的港鐵列車內非禮三十八歲女事主。被告在○七年首次審訊時，裁定非禮罪成判囚二十八天，經上訴後案件發還重審。
案件編號：KCCC 6604/06
HCMA575/2007
香港特別行政區
高等法院原訟法庭
刑事上訴司法管轄權
判罪上訴
案件編號：裁判法院上訴案件2007年第575號
(原九龍城裁判法院案件2006年第6604號)
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香港特別行政區
訴
上訴人 區智樑
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主審法官：高等法院原訟法庭法官阮雲道
聆訊日期：2008年5月6日
裁決日期：2008年5月22日
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判案書
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1. 上訴人經審訊後被裁定一項「猥褻侵犯」罪罪名成立，現上訴人不服定罪，提出上訴。
2. 控罪詳情指上訴人於2006 年9 月14 日，在香港金鐘站駛往尖沙咀站的地鐵列車內，猥褻侵犯另一人，即施華蓉。
上訴理由
3. 代表上訴人的黃敏杰資深大律師提出一個主要的上訴理由，即：
「原審裁判官錯誤地把上訴人的會面記錄(証物P7)視為他在警誡下的回應，沒有考慮其性質是一混合口供(mixed statement)且需要就當中有利上訴人的部份視為可以証明其內容為真實的証據及對其作出評估，有違R. v. Sharp的法律原則。」
4. 黃資深大律師對上述的上訴理由作出以下陳詞：
「証物P7肯定是混合口供。招認部份中，上訴人不單承認了他的在塲(與控方第一証人(PW1)施華蓉女仕出現於同一卡地鐵車廂)，更直接並清楚地承認在案發之時，他與PW1有身體接觸，而且描述了該身體接觸是指他的『右大脾同腰部位置係有同(PW1)嘅背部同屁股有接觸』……」
5. 裁判官在其裁斷陳述書第40段有以下說法：
「再者,被告人在被拘捕警誡時,對指控曾作出反應,而事後在警署與警方的會面中,亦將事件交代。簡單而言,他所述的與無辜的人的反應相吻合。因此,當本席考慮本案所有證供時會緊記以上對被告人有利的因素。」
本席有留意到裁判官在描述上訴人被拘捕警誡時所說的話。裁判官所描述的是上訴人的反應。裁判官描述上訴人的反應是：「他所述的與無辜的人的反應相吻合。」
6. 在裁斷陳述書第47段，裁判官形容當上訴人被拘捕警誡時，他所說的說話是「對事件作出的回應」。在此段裁判官說：
「有關的証供是被告人面對指控時對事件作出的回應。在被捕警誡時,被告人向警員表示車廂擠迫,而他亦已盡量避免與女事主有身體接觸。」
7. 黃大律師陳詞指:
「……把這些能夠証明其內容是事實的証據視為回應，是錯誤地把需要細心考慮的証據的証供價值奪去，嚴重違反R v Sharp的法律原則。」
8. 裁判官在裁斷陳述書第48段說：
「其後返回警署,差不多在事件後6、7小時,他在會面中交代與女事主有身體接觸,他的說法並非控方的版本,被告人所述的是『他右腰和大腿觸及施小姐背部和臀部』。」
本席留意到裁判官指出上訴人在會面中所說的說話並非控方的版本。
9. 裁判官在他的裁斷陳述書說 ：
「53. 根據被告人的版本，他所承認的身體接觸—即他右腰和大腿觸及施小姐背部和臀部。首先，這接觸並非控方所指稱的那般接觸，本席並不認為可重大地協助控方證明針對被告人的控方案情(To materially assist the
prosecution to prove its case against the defendant)；再者，根據被告人承認的接觸，這情況是發生在擠迫的車廂內，而在擠迫的車廂內有這樣的身體接觸，縱然觸及較難為情的部位例如臀部也不一定構成猥褻情況，而且他解釋是由擠迫所造成，換句話說，他並非希望出現這種情況，是迫不得已又沒有猥褻的意圖。因此，他所述的純屬開脫性的供詞。
54. 既然是開脫性供詞，就不會被法庭依賴作為事實的基礎，這只能視作為他面對控罪指控時所作的回應。
55. 再進一步說，故勿論怎樣，本席對於被告人在警誡下和會面中所述的事情經過完全不接纳，認為他沒有將事情真相說出來，他只是在砌辭胶辯而已，因此，本席對於他在警誡下和會面中所講的完全不給予任何比重。」
混合口供(mixed statement)的先例案
10. (1)
In R. v. Sharp [1988] 1 WLR 7, the appellant admitted in a police interview
that he had been in the area at the material time and had heard the burglar
alarm but he gave an innocent explanation for having been there and for his
subsequent conduct. It was held by the
House of Lords that :
「… it was important that a jury
should be directed in a way that they could understand and follow; that they
could not fairly evaluate the facts in an admission unless they could evaluate
the facts in the excuse or explanation accompanying it; and that they should be
directed that the whole of a “mixed” statement
was to be taken into consideration as evidence in deciding where the truth lay,
…」
本席留意到該上訴人只向警方承認他曾經在爆竊案現場的附近，曾聽到警鐘響，但因他解釋他只在該地方與爆竊無關。法庭認為他的口供是混合口供。
(2) In
R. v. Aziz [1995] 2 Cr.App.R. 478 at 484, Lord Steyn quoted Lord Lane CJ in R.
v. Duncan [1981] Vol. 73 Cr.App.R. 359 that all parts of a mixed statement
“were evidence of the facts stated, although their weight as evidence must
differ widely”.
(3) In
R. v. Garrod [1997] Crim.L.R. 445, Evans L.J. said :
「
…This could not be regarded as a satisfactory
exercise, not least because it was almost impossible to conceive of any series
of answers which could not be regarded as containing some admissions of
relevant fact as well as a statement of innocence and denial of guilt. The question was how to identify the kind of
interview which contained enough in the nature of admissions to justify calling
it “mixed”.
Where the statement contained an admission
of fact which was significant to any issue in the case, meaning capable of
adding some degree of weight to the prosecution case on an issue which was
relevant to guilt, the statement must be regarded as “mixed” for the purposes
of this rule. …」
(4) In
HKSAR v. Kong Siu Ming & Others [2000] 2 HKLRD 449, the Court of Appeal
quashed the convictions where a district judge had treated the defendants’
statements as wholly exculpatory and so treated them not as evidence of the
facts but as showing no more than the defendants’ image or reaction when taxed
with the allegations.
The Court of Appeal was of the view that the
statements were “mixed” statements and reiterated that where a “mixed”
statement was under consideration, all parts of the statement were evidence of
the facts stated, although their weight as evidence must differ.
In that case the trial judge did not entirely
ignore the evidence provided in the statements.
The appellants did not give evidence at the trial. The judge referred to a part of the
statements and said that what was stated there was not supported by any
evidence. There were similar references
elsewhere in the reasons for verdict which led the Court of Appeal to conclude
that the “mixed” statement of one of the appellants had not been properly considered
by the judge as evidence.
From
other things said by the judge, the Court of Appeal concluded that the judge
had not regarded the explanations given in the defendants’ interviews as
evidence capable of being considered as forming the basis of a defence. The Court of Appeal regarded this as a
fundamental error in the judge’s approach to the evidence. The court regarded the error as a material
misdirection by the judge and the verdicts against the appellants must be
regarded as suspect.
(5)
HKSAR v. Poon Hoi Wing & Anor [2001] 1 HKC 363, where the Court of Appeal
held that :
「The categorization by a judge of
a statement as wholly exculpatory when it ought to have been categorized as
mixed will almost inevitably constitute a material irregularity, …」
And in
that case the Court of Appeal proceeded on the basis that there was such a
material irregularity.
(6)
HKSAR v. Yuen Man Tung [2004] 3 HKC 274, where Stock JA said at page 280 :
「… Whether a statement is or is not
wholly exculpatory is not a question resolved by having regard to the issues
which remain to be determined in the light of admissions made at the time of
trial. Its nature is to be determined
rather by its content at the time it is made.
If it is adverse to the person making it in relation to an important
element of the offence charged―and this is not intended to be an exhaustive
delineation, but merely one that suffices for the purpose of the present
case―then self-evidently it is not wholly exculpatory. …」
(7)
HKSAR v. Wong Chi Wan, CACC156/2005, where on arrest for an allegation of rape,
the appellant said to a police officer :
「I did not rape her. She did it with me of her own free will…」
Stuart-Moore VP giving the judgement of the
court said :
「Mr Reading accepted that the
applicant’s statement, albeit a denial
of rape, implicitly amounted to an admission on the part of the applicant to an
essential ingredient of the offence by his concession to having had sexual
intercourse with the complainant. As
such, this was a ‘mixed’ statement,
being partly exculpatory and partly inculpatory.」
Further on Stuart-Moore VP said :
「… Plainly, the exculpatory element
contained in the applicant’s reply was evidence of the truth
of what was said, although it might not carry the same weight as the
inculpatory part. …」
(8)
HKSAR v. Lo Wai Ming, CACC530/2005, where in the video-recorded interview of
the appellant, he admitted that cash of $25,000 odd had been found in his own
car after his arrest as well as $7,000 cash in his wallet. He agreed that the money was his. Little of that was in issue as the appellant
gave evidence at the trial in broadly the same terms except for one matter. The Court of Appeal was of the view that that
statement was a mixed statement. McMahon
J given the judgment of the court said :
「
Given the contents of Ex. D1 summarized above, while it came to be that
they were broadly in accordance with the appellant’s evidence
at trial and therefore made no admission as to any live issue, we have
concluded that important parts of Ex. D1 were in fact inculpatory and that the
statement as a whole should have been regarded as “mixed”. As an example, the appellant’s admission in
Ex. D1 that the sum of $32,000 odd in total in his possession at the time of
his arrest was the basis of cross-examination of him to the effect he had come
to that location to meet Lau with sufficient money to make payment or part
payment for the drugs that Lau was to provide to him.
A statement which contains admissions does
not change in nature simply because the matters the admissions pertain to
become dead issues at trial. The
statement, if “mixed” in its nature, remains so. Nor do those admissions have to directly go
to an element of the offence. They may be
circumstantial in nature. But if they
are such as to be able to materially assist the prosecution to prove its case
against the defendant they render the nature of the statement “mixed”.」
本席留意到在該上訴案，上訴人只承認32,000 元是他的財物，但上訴庭認為該份口供應當作為一份混合口供。
11. 代表答辯人的高級政府律師的陳詞指本案的事實背景是上訴人於干犯猥褻侵犯罪行時，被即場發現及拘捕。許律師說：
「……在此情況下，上訴人於警誡供詞中不得不『承認』他涉案時在場，並與PW1有身體接觸。就本案的案情而言，以上所謂的兩點『招認』均不能重大地協助控方證明針對上訴人的控方案情。再者，上訴人所『承認』的身體接觸及發生的情況，實為否定控罪中『猥褻』的元素，因此他於供詞中所述的可以被看為開脫性質的。」
12. 本席不同意該陳詞。只要上訴人有承認某些問題是對他不利的，該供詞就應成為一個混合口供。上訴人所認的問題無須可以重大地協助控方證明針對他的案情。
13. 許律師又陳詞說：
「……裁判官其實有就上訴人的警誡供詞內所述的事情經過加以考慮及分析。……」
本席不同意許律師的陳詞。
14. 本席認為上訴人在警誡下所說的說話和他的會面記錄中所作出的交代應該成為混合的供詞。正如上訴庭在Poon Hoi Wing一案說如果法官應該分類一份口供為混合供詞，但他分類為開脫的供詞，這錯誤必定會產生一個屬於具關鍵性的違反常規的(material irregularity)。正如Lo Wai Ming一案指出，「to materially assist the
prosecution to prove its case against the defendant」並非是唯一的定義來決定一份口供是否混合口供。正如Yuen Man Tung一案指出如果被告人的口供的內容關於控罪其中一個元素是對被告人不利，該份口供應該被法庭分類為一份混合口供。
15. 基於上述理由，本席裁決上訴人的定罪上訴得直。裁判官定罪的命令及判刑撤銷。因案情嚴重，本席裁決上訴人應在另一位裁判官席前重審。上訴人現時的擔保繼續延期至重審完結。
(阮雲道)
高等法院原訟法庭法官
答辯人：
由律政司高級政府律師許紹鼎代表。
上訴人：
由郭紹文律師事務所轉聘黃敏杰資深大律師及招秉茵大律師代表。
