在公衆地方管有攻擊性武器 公安條例》第33(1) 袁國強

HCMA609/2007
 Oriental Daily


1. 本上訴以案件呈述 (case stated) 的方式由控方提出，根據的法律為香港法例第227 章《裁判官條例》第105 條。
Explanation : If any party believes any determination of a magistrate has been made incorrectly on a point of law or it has been made in excess of jurisdiction, an application may be made to a magistrate for him to state a case.

The magistrate must set out the facts and grounds upon which he reached his decision and must also include the grounds upon which the proceedings are questioned and upon which the opinion of a judge is required. The case is then delivered to the appellant for his action.

An application for an appeal by way of case stated under section 105 ofthe Magistrates Ordinance must be made within 14 clear days of the original determination, which includes the date of refusal to grant a review of the earlier or the date upon which the review was determined: Magistates Ordinance, s104(10).

Since the SJ intervenes  as in this case, the original complainant or informant ceases to be a party: Magistrates Ordinance, s105.

Particulars of Charge
控罪指答辯人「在中環士丹頓街68 號外，沒有合法權限或合理辯解而攜有攻擊性武器，即一個鎚子」，日期為2006 年4 月24 日。
由於答辯人在事發時已超過25 歲(實質是54 歲)，所以在本案的法定刑罰為不多於3 年的監禁：《公安條例》第33(2)(d) 條。此外，此罪乃「例外罪行」，根據香港法例第221 章《刑事訴訟程序條例》第 109B及109G 條不能緩刑。換言之，答辯人在定罪後必須入獄，法庭別無選擇。

No prosecution can be instituted under POO s33 without the consent of SJ . s33(5)
*Note too if amendment to charge at the trial is one of substance, not trivial, then fresh consent needs to be obtained. See 
HCMA 19/2008 Cheung Wai Lung（張偉龍）



Offensive weapon : POO s.2 defines,
Offensive weapon means any article made or adapted for use , or suitable for causing injury to the person or intended by the person having it in his possission or under his control for such use by him or by some other person

In the instant case
" 個鎚仔係15 吋長嘅鎚仔，你要用嘅目的唔係話打算去做任何非法嘅嘢，而係你當時已經做緊非法嘅嘢，就係追住人嚟打"
約一小時之後(中午12 點零8 分)，裁判官主動把案件再次傳喚，理由是對控罪有質疑。簡而言之，就是鎚子在事發時是否擬供答辯人作傷害他人的用途，否則根據《公安條例》第2 條的解釋不能構成攻擊性武器。裁判官在庭上表示：「嗰個所謂『意欲鎚打』，喺咁嘅情況下，同埋只係埋去兇佢、嚇佢冇分別，個『意欲』睇起上嚟都好似去鎚打 咁，但係佢埋到去嘅時候佢冇打，呢個就係事實嘅結癥。亅主控指「要睇番個intention亅，裁判官就說「個intention如果真係要打就打咗亅， 並援引Archbold Hong Kong 2005第25-123 段所記載的R. v. Edmonds [1963] 2 QB 142作支持。該案説明，如果被告的意欲只在嚇人，那將不足以令涉案物件變成攻擊性武器，除非驚嚇的程度肯定會令對方造成實質傷害。
 就這樣，裁判官把案件押後至下午。同時，他要求控方對案件作重新考慮，並謂，除非控方能説服法庭答辯人的認罪答辯穩妥，否則他將行使《裁判官條例》第104 條所賦予的權力(Review)，推翻定罪、著令答辯人改變答辯、及排期再審。
Note: s.104 Magistrates Ordinance 
allows either party to proceedings to apply to a magistrate for a review of his determination on any matter which it is within his power to determine in a summary way
any matter includes conviction, sentence , acquittal

聆訊在同日下午2 點半恢復。控方試圖援引身藏水管作自衛用途(即未有實質襲擊都仍然罪成)的案例失敗，裁判官跟著亦緊照他先前所說的而行。唯一的分別在，他沒有把案件再行 排期。相反，裁判官示意辯方把控方的案情完全同意下來、立即開審。主控先申請押後(因堅持要傳召證人)、再申請由別的法庭處理(怕裁判官失去中立)，最後 都被一一駁回。主控始終認爲不妥，裁判官就說：「作爲檢控嘅代表，面對呢個情況，你只有兩個選擇，就係繼續聆訊，一係就不提證供，因爲本席已經作咗呢兩個 裁決 ….。亅結果，控方選擇前者，並呈遞了答辯人認罪時的同意案情、證人 (1)和(2)共五份書面證人供詞、和證人 (3)(警員5306)的記事冊作舉證之用。
根據《刑事檢控條例》嘅65B嗰度同意咗嗰個證人嘅口供, 等於個證人傳咗上庭，而你哋係冇盤問咁解。
*written statement by any person shall be admissible as evidence as oral evidence


MR CHU(prosecutor)：not wanting to rely on just paper trial , contents 加添嗰啲我相信我哋要睇吓個證人講到啲乜嘢。
官：唔可以--你係作為檢控嘅，唔可以睇吓個證人講到啲乜嘢愛嚟支持你個控罪?嘛 官：就算辯方同意晒你所有嘅案情、同意你嘅證人口供，你都依然認為唔適合聆訊？

MR CHU：係，我哋覺得一個所謂paper trial，一個用文件嚟審訊係唔適合。
MISS WAI：我諗法官閣下，如果係咁嘅話，咁即係對辯方嚟講係一個好唔公平嘅一個審訊。
MR CHU：但係法官閣......
官：如果係咁嘅話，我唯有叫控方不提證供支持呢份控罪個囉喎，你係咪想採取呢一個態度吖？
MR CHU：法官閣下，控方--我相信控方其實係有一個權利係去點樣去conduct佢哋嗰個case。
官：但係我已經拒絕咗你兩項申請，第一，延訊嘅申請；第二，要本庭--本席退席嘅申請，已經拒絕咗個囉喎。
MR CHU：係，口供係可以，但係我哋始終覺得，因為想--亦都有無數嘅案例都話明一個paper trial係not advisable，咁我哋只可以咁講，我哋係唔覺得咁樣係一個合適嘅方法。
官：佢話唔advisable就係真係當有事情係有爭議部分啫，但係而家冇爭議部分吖嘛，而家被告人係接受你嘅案情吖嘛。

S65b S65C
MR CHU：可以，係，係。咁我哋接受審訊，咁但係如果冇其他嘢底下，我只可以講我哋亦都今日只可以有咁多嘢嘞，冇其他嘢可以做繼續。
官：好，呢份案情可唔可以成為同意嘅案情，控方證物P1？(s65C)
MR CHU：可以成為同意案情。
官：每份口供逐份、逐份遞上嚟，因為每一份口供都會變成控方嘅證物。
MR CHU：係。控方有三份嘅口供。
官：係咪正本嚟？
MR CHU：三個正--係正本嚟。

MISS WAI：大人，有樣嘢我想要保留嘅就係話，我諗而家嘅問題就係話，假如我哋係，辯方係同意咗個案情嘅話，係咪就變咗佢哋會再加啲口供上嚟，咁如果口供裡面嘅嘢同案情裡面有衝突，咁咪變咗--即是話變咗嚟講會有一個矛盾喺度？
官：唔會有矛盾，案情係--同意案情係根據65C，所以佢係會take priority嘅。

終於，裁判官裁定本案的表面證據不成立，原因主要在答辯人有兩次機會實際鎚打證人 (1)，卻只推了他一下。這是裁判官看過所有書面證人供詞後的結論。因此，他認爲，根據經典判例 Galbraith 的第二個測試，案中實沒有表面證據證明答辯人有意圖用鎚子令受害人受傷，所以亦沒有表面證據證明鎚子是攻擊性武器。接著，他引用《裁判官條例》第27 條的規定，把控罪修改為「普通襲擊亅。答辯人認罪，之後被判罰款4000 元了事。
S.27(1)
where it appears to the adjudicating magistrate tht there is
(a) a defect in the substance or form of any complaint, information or summons.......
(2) the adjudicating magistrate shall amend te complaint, information or summons where
(a) the defect ..... is not material; or
(b) any injustice which might otherwise be caused by an amendment would be cured by an order as to costs, an adjournment
(3) ..... shall
(a) ead and explain the amended complaint ...... to he defendant;
(b) give leave to the parties to call or recall and futher examine such witnesses.... having regard to the amendment;

 4 questions case stated
(1)   在答辯人承認原控罪及承認案情撮要的情況下，本席運用   《裁判官條例》第104 條推翻定罪的裁決是否正確；
(2)       在本席先裁定答辯人罪名成立後又自行行使覆核權推翻原罪名定罪的情況下，本席拒絕控方申請由另一法官處理本案的裁定是否錯誤行使本席的酌情權；
(3)       本席否決控方傳召證人作供的申請，是否對控方不公平，及造成不公平的審訊；及
(4)       在審訊中根據控方所呈堂的證供，本席裁定原控罪表面證供不成立的裁決是否正確。亅

High Court Judge Answers暫委法官彭偉昌
(1) 
14. 我認爲這問題的應有答案是「否亅。
15. 我認爲，同意案情所講的「意欲鎚打亅，意思非常明顯，就是具有用鎚子襲擊他人的意圖。律師在求情時指答辯人一時衝動，把鎚子拿去「做一個襲擊亅(見上文第 5 段)，就是確認。反過來，律師由始至終都沒有說過答辯人只在嚇唬別人。她後來改口，已是中午12 點零8 分以後的事，明顯在順著裁判官的態度而改變立場。
16. 至於裁判官再三強調、即答辯人始終沒有下手那點，我亦認爲不能以此作定論，因答辯人在最後一刻沿崖勒馬也絕非不可能，反正同意案情簡單，沒有時間方面的描述。事實上，裁判官在首次聽取答辯後的評語，就頗有點這個睇法的意味(見上文第6 段)。
17. 基於上述兩個原因，裁判官的終極結論，只能說是他的主觀推敲，沒有實質支持，而且與同意案情不符。引用終審法院在 Li Man Wai v. Secretary for Justice [2003] 3 HKLRD 1037一案所定下的説法，就是「任何合理的裁判官均不可能達致的裁斷亅。這是我的判斷。

19. 在討論 R. v. Edmonds一案期間(見上文第8 段)，我曾要求與訟雙方摸清此案的來龍去脈，結果帶出了另一問題如下：鎚子既是答辯人的工具，那麽他在工作時一時氣憤拿來打人，又是否應作「在公衆地方管有攻擊性武器」論處？
20. 這問題的出現，源於判例 R. v. Jura [1954] 1 QB 503。英國上訴庭在該案裁定，一個正在遊樂場射靶子的被告，斷不能因把槍射向其友人而按《Prevention of Crime Act 1953》第1(1) 條 “carrying an offensive weapon without authority or reasonable excuse in a public place”定罪。
21. 然而，我在讀過與訟雙方提供的十多個英國判例後發現，這系列的典據，根本不適用於香港。這已明確寫進了Archbold Hong Kong 2005及2007的第25-116 段。


在如何界定攻擊性武器的問題上，法律文獻有以下的說法：

“…. The definition, when it is read in conjunction with the comments in R v Chong Ah-choi and Others, above, means there are three categories of offensive weapon:

(a)   an article made for use for causing injury to the person, commonly known as weapons offensive per se;

(b)  an article adapted for use for causing injury to the person;

(c)   an article intended by the person having it with him for use for causing injury to the person.

       In many cases, little or no distinction is drawn between the first two categories.  However, there is a very clear distinction between the first two and the third categories.  It is the requirement that the prosecution must prove an intent to injure in cases involving weapons in the third category.”

…. trial judges are entitled to take judicial notice of the fact that a flick-knife is an offensive weapon per se.  Weapons which are manufactured for an innocent purpose are not offensive per se, eg a razor (R v Petrie 45 Cr App R 72, CA); a penknife (R v Humphreys [1977] Crim L R 255, CA).  Not all knives are offensive weapons per se.  It remains to be seen whether judges and magistrates may now regard it as determined that the pervious decisions have decided that those items are weapons offensive per se, either by regarding the matters as one of which they may take judicial notice or by being bound by previous decisions.  However, against this must be weighed the consideration, referred to in the following paragraph, that the decision as to whether a weapon is offensive per se is one for the jury to take (see, in particular, Williamson, above).  Where an article has no readily apparent use except to cause injury to the person, it is submitted that judicial notice may well be appropriate.

       Where there is no doubt as to whether an article is an offensive weapon per se, the decider of fact must have their attention drawn to the statutory definition, but determining whether an article in question is an offensive weapon: HKSAR v Omar Harcon Mohamed (unrep, HCMA 46/1999).”

(見Hong Kong Archbold (204), para.25‑118, 119。)

事實上，根據我個人記憶，哪一刻他把手上的物件視作傷人器具，那一刻被告就被視作「管有攻擊性武器」，這向來都是香港的司法取向，從來未受質疑。無論是拿 刀追著別人來砍的廚子，抑或做法與本案相似的地盤工人，盡皆如此。物件是否他們在工場上剛拿著的工具，根本無關。在街上與人爭執，順手拿起周圍的物件作武 器，就更是這樣。

問題(2)
24. 我認爲這問題的應有答案乃「是亅。
25. 上訴方指法官應否在某件案件避席，要視乎「客觀的旁觀者是否有合理理由擔心他會有所偏頗亅，這點我沒有異議：Deacons v. White & Case Ltd Liability Partnership & Others [2003] 2 HKLRD 840。他們指控方試圖按本身的喜好挑選法官 (forum shopping)，我則不能同意。下面是我的理由。
26. 裁判官一時忘了本案的法定刑罰，這非常明顯，否則他不會下令為答辯人索取感化官及社會服務令報告，因爲這徒然在浪費公帑。及至主控向他讀出有關的規定，裁 判官還堅持上述的命令，就很難不讓人覺得有點進退失據。更不幸者，他在一小時後自行把案件傳回，對控罪提出了無甚根據的質疑。午後，主控力陳其見解不果， 他又示意律師無懼把控方的案情照單全收，立刻開審。律師怕書面證人供詞的内容對答辯人不利，裁判官就更表示同意案情乃根據《刑事程序條例》第65C 條入證，有約束力、會優先(見有關部份的謄本)。總括而言，就是予人一種定意要達到某個結果的感覺。說得坦白一點，就是想盡辦法要避免把答辯人送進監獄。
 27.  當然，裁判官本身可能絲毫沒有上面的想法，只是根據自己看爲對的方法處事，但對「客觀的旁觀者亅而言又是另一回事。

問題 (3)
28. 我認爲這問題的應有答案乃「是亅。
29. 書面審訊 (paper trial) 的弊處之多，原屬老生常談，這裡無須重複。這是第一點，為控方申請押後時所依賴。
30. 除非控方濫用司法程序，否則法官不應干涉。這是第二點，是個行之有時的原則。
31. 特別在傳召證人的事上，上訴庭就曾經說過 (Secretary for Justice v. Fan Kin-chung, CACC381/2002)：
“The third equally undisputed position was that it is for the prosecution, and not the judge, to decide which witness should be called subject always to relevance, admissibility and to the prosecuting counsel not abusing the process of the court ….”
更何況本案的證人是受害人、目擊事件的街坊和問過答辯人問題的警員。
32. 從大原則轉向細節。
33. 裁判官決定開審，是下午2 半以後的事。證人因答辯人認罪而早已離開，是個合理的假設，反之亦不能構成控方的延誤。二，即時開審，在當時沒有迫切性。三，裁判官曾一度同意押後(見有 關部份的謄本)，但得悉控方想讓他避席後卻即時改變態度，很難不令人覺得是意氣之爭。四，裁判官最後表明立場，除非控方接受書面審訊，否則將被視作不舉 證，令情況更壞，因控方根本沒有選擇。
34. 當然，裁判官會說，證人就算真的到庭也不能超出已有的説法，結果不會有變，答辯人依然會脫罪。然而，據謄本顯示，直到這個階段裁判官還未有機會讀到他們的 書面證人供詞。他有的只是同意案情。不過，就算他讀了，上訴庭在Secretary for Justice v. Fan Kin-chung的另一段話卻仍不失其意義：
“… unless a prosecutor is abusing the process of the court or is seeking to introduce irrelevant or inadmissible evidence, it is improper for a judge prematurely to make up his mind as to whether or not there is a case to answer before the court has had the opportunity to hear the whole of the evidence which the prosecution intends to adduce.” 
35. 總括而言，我不認爲控方曾得到公平對待、會心悅誠服。

38. 上訴方的上訴得直。「普通襲擊亅的定罪及罰款同時撤銷。「在公衆地方管有攻擊性武器」的定罪維持。答辯人因事件纏身多時而酌情輕判入獄3 天。

裁判官不可能再引用法例中的「適合用作傷害他人的物品」屬攻擊性武器的考慮來支持定罪 (見裁斷陳述書第31 段)。這是考慮到上訴庭在女皇訴莊阿財 (譯音) [1994] 3 HKC 68的判決。上訴庭法官包致金(當時的官階) 已裁定法例定義中「適合用作傷害他人的物品」的部份，與人權法不符。因此裁判官不應再採用這個定義去作裁決。

Fan kin chung
"if relevant and admissible evidence remains to be called by a prosecutor who wishes to adduce it, the judge cannot prevent this unless the conduct of counsel amounts to an abuse of the process of the court."