西醫幸凌宇火酒咳藥水

2006 incident report 2006年09月07日 星期四

6歲童入院揭發 涉東涌西醫幸凌宇

50病童疑服「火酒」藥水

撰文:米俊樺、冼韻姬、曾秋文

欄名:嚴重失誤

衞生署昨晚緊急通報，一名6歲男童因傷風感冒向東涌逸東邨一名私家醫生幸凌宇求診，獲處方標籤收鼻水及抗敏感的透明藥水，但男童服用後口部灼熱而入院求醫；經醫院化驗，揭發藥水含有消毒火酒成分，而初步調查約有另外５０名小童曾服用藥水。

【本報訊】西醫幸凌宇涉於06年在東涌逸東商場診所向4名小童開出「火酒咳藥水」，遭到票控，他和診所女護士否認控罪，案件昨於荃灣裁判法院開審。其中一名小童的母親在庭上透露，她曾到診所追究，有人明言「如果你報警，我前途就係咁」。

　94年在愛爾蘭貝爾法斯特皇后大學內外全科醫學士畢業的幸凌宇(37歲)和診所護士盧笑娟(51歲)，各被票控一項非法銷售未經註冊的藥劑製品，幸另被票控多4項售賣藥物是擬供人使用、但卻是不宜作該用途罪。

　控方昨傳召4名曾服用懷疑「火酒咳藥水」小童的家長作供，4人的子女各因不同疾病看醫生，最終分別找醫生質問、接獲衛生署通知、致電衛生署熱線而得悉子女「食錯藥」。其中一童服用的藥水被驗出含有百分之一點一的火酒成份；另一名家長在庭外說：「以後都唔會睇私家醫生，就算睇政府醫生要排隊，為個女都無計」。

6歲童服藥後感「好涼」

　衛生署藥劑師劉家榮供稱，06年9月4日到診所調查期間，檢查買藥水的單據及各種藥水的存放位置，火酒則另外置於一個趟櫃內。當他向幸指出，將此含量的撲爾敏藥水開給病人似乎較重時，幸只回答稱「這是一個常見做法」，並表示診所無稀釋藥水的習慣，但由於每支藥水來貨份量多，為防倒瀉，護士會先將藥水倒進較小的容器，再倒進合適容器始予病人，其間幸會在現場監察。

　6歲男童的母親楊惠玲(譯音)供稱，06年9月4日帶兒子看醫生，當兒子服用一樽呈透明的藥水時，聲稱「好涼」，翌日拒絕再服，她用舌頭試味，嗅到一股類似酒精的味道。她續稱，與丈夫於傍晚時分帶同藥水到診所了解事件，當醫生拿起藥水一嗅，即說：「係酒精喎」，其丈夫即大喊要報警，並要將服過3次藥的兒子送院檢查，幸醫生聞言即謂：「如果你報警，我前途就係咁」。及後，幸撰信轉介男童往醫院，他需留院觀察。

被告怕報警令前途玩完

　她在辯方盤問下表示，往診所投訴當日曾離家約兩小時，屋內只有男童、兩名19和10歲的姊姊，男童曾向姊姊透露「我個口好涼，有煙噴出」，並強調幸醫生曾撰信，但無建議小童要入院檢查。

　傳票控罪指幸凌宇於06年9月6日，為銷售及分銷而管有未經藥劑業及毒藥管理局註冊的藥劑製品或物質，即4樽3.6公升的藥劑製品內，每5毫升就含有10毫克的撲爾敏；並於去年8月16至9月4日期間，在診所內售賣共4樽無顏色的液體，內含撲爾敏。

【本報訊】西醫幸凌宇涉嫌於06年向病人處方含消毒火酒感冒藥水，導致多人喉嚨不適、作悶或嘔吐，昨日與女助護在荃灣裁判法院被裁定售賣不宜飲用藥水等六罪成立，裁判官嘉理仕批評西醫貪求便宜，向並非正規藥廠買藥水肇禍，相信審訊對其行醫生涯已造成嚴重影響，故判罰款8萬元，女助護則判罰3,000元。

幸凌宇在東涌逸東商場的診所昨日沒有開門營業，有姓葉街坊雖聽聞兩年前的「火酒溝藥水」事件，卻不知主角正是幸凌宇，附近診所的女護士則強調不會「溝藥」。

幸凌宇（37歲）被控於06年8月至9月，在其診所出售四樽含抗敏感藥氯笨那敏的藥水，但藥物成份超標五倍，未經註冊，又在診所售賣四樽不宜供人使用的氯笨那敏藥水；女助護盧笑娟（51歲）則被控於06年9月，在診所出售一樽不宜供人使用的氯笨那敏藥水。

官認為兩人夾口供

裁判官昨日接納控方證人的口供，不接納兩名被告的自辯，認為兩人夾口供，因次被告受西醫指使才犯案，刑責較輕，近日更患上癌症，故予以輕判。

事源06年9月，一名6歲男童因感冒及咳嗽向幸凌宇求診，獲處方抗敏感及收鼻水的藥水，事後感口部灼熱，入院求診，證實藥水有消毒火酒成份，衞生署證實有31名病人獲處方問題藥水，當中7人在服藥後曾出現喉嚨不適、作悶或嘔吐症狀。

衞生署在診所搜出未經註冊及氯笨那敏超標的藥水，又向病人收集了一些含火酒的藥水，有藥水的火酒含量高達43%，但調查發現，原裝藥水不含火酒，懷疑在診所內稀釋時發生意外。

案件編號： TWS1952-57/07 

　西醫幸凌宇（右）及女助護盧笑娟（左）因向病人出售火酒咳藥水，分別被判罸款4.5萬及1500元，二人就定罪向終院上訴被駁回，盧早前在申請上訴後已去世。

　　【明報專訊】西醫幸凌宇與助護因向病人出售含有火酒的咳藥水，分別被判罸款4.5萬及1500元，兩人不服，向終審法院上訴。終院裁決指出，兩人不能以普通法中「真誠相信藥物適合人用」作抗辯，而助護即使只是職員，但她負責入藥、貼標籤並向病人解釋服法，故同樣需負刑責。

　　醫生維持罸4.5萬

　　雖然本案助護盧笑娟在申請上訴終院後身故，但常任法官包致金考慮到罪名對死者的聲譽及其家人的感受，認為法律有必要釐清，故繼續審理其上訴。終院5名法官一致裁定幸凌宇的定罪維持，至於盧的定罪，5名法官中只有包致金裁定她上訴得直，認為她作為職員，道德上沒有責任判她罪成。

　　2006年西醫幸凌宇向病人處方「火酒藥水」，經審訊後被裁定4項售賣不宜供人使用藥物及1項管有未註冊藥物傳票罪成，助護盧笑娟則被裁定一項售賣不宜供人使用藥物罪成，兩人被判罸款4.5萬元及1500元。

　　李義法官指出，《公衆 生及市政條例》第54（1）條不能簡單倚賴不知道藥物內有雜質作抗辯，但被告可按條例中第70及71條要求，證明藥物購自正當供應商、自己沒懷疑藥物出問題，以及購入與出售期間藥物沒有改變作為抗辯。

　　官：要保障市民安心用藥

　　法官陳兆愷補充，條例立法原意是保障市民安心用藥，診所及藥房作為最後把關人，病人一向予以極大信賴，因此賣藥者必須時刻清楚所售藥物是否安全。

　　【案件編號：FCCC7/09】

How Strict are Strict Liability Offences in Hong Kong

Alex Lee

Introduction

Law enforcement agencies like strict liability offences.1 The reason is obvious. They are more effective enforcement tools than offences which

require proof of full mens rea. Recognising that strict liability offences may catch people who do not have a culpable state of mind, and to mitigate the

harshness, the legislature very often provides for defences in which, the burden of establishing the defence rest with the accused.2

Before Hin Lin Yee

Whether the presumption of mens rea has been displaced as regards a particular offence is a matter of construction. The position in Hong Kong

used to be that there was no “half-way house” between strict liability offences and full mens rea offences. However, in 1994 the dividing line between

the two categories was blurred by the ground-breaking judgment of the Court of Appeal in Attorney General v Fong Chin Yue and others3 which was

delivered three years after the Bill of Rights was enacted.4

Fong Chin Yue was a case stated appeal by the prosecution in relation to charges brought under section 17 of the Dutiable Commodities Ordinance,

Cap. 109 (DCO).5 The questions for the Court of Appeal were narrowly defined, namely (i) whether the offences were ones of strict liability so that the

prosecution was not required to prove that the defendant had knowledge of the status of the goods in question as dutiable goods; (ii) if so, whether

the section violated the presumption of innocence as protected by the Bill of Rights; and (iii) if so, what the results of such violation were. The Court,

however, seized the opportunity and introduced to Hong Kong jurisprudence a common law “halfway-house” defence. Among other things, it was

held that the prosecution did not have to prove that the accused knew that duty on the goods was outstanding. However, it was a defence for the

accused to prove on a balance of probabilities that he believed for good and sufficient reason, although erroneously, that the provisions of the DCO

relating to the goods had been complied with, which compliance of course included duty having been paid.

The judgment of Fong Chin Yue had repercussions across the board.6 It also affected the ability of the Customs & Excise in combating unlawful

dealing in dutiable commodities. Thus, in 1996 the Legislature introduced to the DCO a new 17(11), the effect of which is to put an additional requirement on the accused to establish “reasonable diligence” over and above the common law defence. This statutory defence is not unique

and the same drafting technique has also been employed in other ordinances which have strict liability offences. The effect of this type of statutory defences was considered in HKSAR v Ho Hon Chun Danel and others7 which was about copyright offences brought under section 118 of the

Copyright Ordinance, Cap. 528. Woo VP, who gave the judgment of the Court of Appeal, said,8

“Where a statute makes an offence one of strict liability, without requiring the prosecution to prove the mens rea usually

required under the common law, the common law defence of honest and reasonable belief should be available, unless the

statutory intent is clear that the offence is one of absolute liability. But if a statute specifies a certain defence for the statutory

offence, it would be most unlikely that the legislative intent is also to make available to the accused such common law

defence.” (Emphasis added)

For years, this dictum was valued for its predictability. However, it now has to be qualified in view of the recent development of the law.

Hin Lin Yee

In 2010, the Court of Final Appeal in Hin Lin Yee and another v HKSAR9 gave a definitive judgment on the common law approach to the presumption

of mens rea. Based on the judgment of Ribeiro PJ, who gave the judgment of the Court, the common law previously laid down in Gammon (Hong

(1 Strict liability may be conveniently defined as crimes which do not require intention, recklessness or even negligence as to one or more elements in the actus reus. See

Smith & Hogan Criminal Law, 12th Edition, p.150. 2 This is by the operation of s.94A of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, Cap. 221 or other similar provisions like s.24 of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201. 3 [1995] 1 HKCLR 193. 4 The Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383. 5 S.17(1) of DCO provides:

 No person shall import or export or have in his possession, custody or control, or in any way deal with or dispose of, any goods to which this Ordinance applies-

(a) except in accordance with the provisions of this Ordinance; or

(b) unless he has discharged all the obligations with respect to the goods imposed upon him by or under this Ordinance)

Kong) Ltd v Attorney General of Hong Kong10 has been refined and should be restated as follows:11

(a) The statutory language: The first question to ask is whether the presumption of mens rea has been displaced. The statute may employ

adverbs like “knowingly” or “negligently”; or it may use verbs or nouns which may or may not have connotations of awareness or intent on the

defendant’s part.

(b) The nature and subject-matter of the offence: The more serious the offence in terms of penalty and social obloquy, the less likely it is that

the presumption will be held to have been supplanted.

(c) Regulatory offences: There is generally less need to feel inhibited about overriding the presumption in relation these offences. Typical

examples are offences under public health, licensing and industrial legislation. Where a halfway house option exists, displacement of the

presumption might well lead to such offences being dealt with on an intermediate basis of liability instead.

(d) The legislative purpose: If, in the light of the nature and subject-matter of the offence, construing the provision to require full mens rea would

make successful prosecution so unlikely that the statutory objectives would be frustrated, this must be given weight. Where this is a legitimate

consideration, the response should often be to consider whether the adoption of an intermediate basis of liability accords with the true

legislative intention.

(e) The other alternatives: Having considered the statutory language and purpose broadly, as indicated above, if the presumption is overridden,

one goes on to consider the other alternatives:

(i) to allow a defence if the defendant could prove on the balance of probabilities that the prohibited act was done in the honest and

reasonable belief that the circumstances were such that, if true, he would not be guilty of the offence (Intermediate basis of liability);

(ii) to confine the defences open to the accused in relation to his mental state to the statutory defences expressly provided for in relation to

the offence charged (Exclusionary statutory defence); or

(iii) to make the offence one of absolute liability so that the persecution succeeded if the accused was proved to have performed or bought

about the actus reus, regardless of his state of mind. (Absolute liability).

After Hin Lin Yee

There are, however, two aspects of Hin Lin Yee which merit further discussion:

(a) when the presence of a statutory defence would be taken as excluding the common law “half-way house” defence; and

(b) whether and how constitutional issues may affect the approach to the presumption of mens rea.

Exclusionary statutory defence

Ribeiro PJ has left open the possibility of concurrent availability of the common law defence and statutory defences when they are not “inconsistent”.

Thus, it cannot now be said that the fact that a statutory defence is specified for a strict liability offence, it is most unlikely that the common law “half-way

house” defence would be available. Ribeiro PJ restricts the effect of Ho Hon Chun Danel and says:

“95. His Lordship no doubt had in mind situations where the statutory defences were inconsistent with the concurrent

availability of a common law defence since he pointed out that there was an “overlap” between the statutory defences and

the “common law defence of honest and reasonable belief” in that case.”

Later on, his Lordship goes on to say:12

“164. The key question is whether the statutory defence, properly construed, is inconsistent with the availability of the third

alternative. If so, only the statutory defence can be relied on.”

 As to what may amount to inconsistency, the following guidance is gleaned from Hin Lin Yee:

(a) a statutory defence is not inconsistent when it covers different facts and is wider than the defence of honest and reasonable belief;13 and

(b) the fact that there are additional requirements in the statutory defence shows that the legislative intent plainly is to regard an honest and

reasonable belief as insufficient.14

Constitutional issues

Ribeiro PJ prefaces his judgment in Hin Lin Yee with the caveat that his discussion proceeds solely on the basis of common law principles, as no

constitutional issues were raised in that case.15

However, it is difficult to determine whether and how far constitutional issues may affect the common law approach to the presumption of mens rea.

This is because there is a line of authorities to the effect that, because of the high human rights content of the rules of construction which the courts

apply to determine what a penal provision really means, where the conclusion that a statutory offence is an offence of strict liability is one arrived by a

process of construction, then there would be no room left for an argument that the statutory provision creating that offence is inconsistent with the Bill

of Rights.16 This line of authorities suggests that it is sufficient to consider just the common law when deciding whether the presumption of mens rea

has been displaced as regards a particular statutory offence.

On the other hand, there is another line of authority that when deciding whether something is an element of offence or a matter for the defence to

establish, human rights law will come into play. In HKSAR v Ng Po On,

17 the following dictum of Lord Steyn in R v Lambert & Others is cited with

approval:18

 “The distinction between constituent elements of the crime and defensive issues will sometimes be unprincipled and

arbitrary. After all, it is sometimes simply a matter of which drafting technique is adopted: a true constituent element can

be removed from the definition of the crime and cast as a defensive issue whereas any definition of an offence can be

reformulated so as to include all possible defences within it. It is necessary to concentrate not on technicalities and niceties

of language but rather on matters of substance.”

In Ng Po On, Ribeiro PJ stated:19

“Thus, it does not matter whether the ultimate fact which the defendant is required to prove involves an element which may

be characterized as an essential ingredient of the offence or a matter of defence. Its substantive effect is what counts: does

the enactment expose the defendant to a conviction even though there may be a reasonable doubt regarding some matter

determinative of his criminal liability?” (Emphasis supplied)

One situation in which constitutional issues may arise in strict liability offences is where the lack of a culpable state of mind is, on the face of it, a

negative averment for the defence to establish.20 It remains to be seen how the courts will resolve the apparent conflict between these two lines of

authority.

Despite the comprehensive way in which the Court of Final Appeal has dealt with strict liability offences, it appears that this area of the law remains an

issue for attention and resolution.

13 Tolson (1889) 23 QBC 168 was given by Ribeiro PJ as an example. In that case, the prisoner was convicted of “bigamy. The jury found that at the time of the second

marriage she in good faith and on reasonable grounds believed her husband to be dead. The 24 & 25 Vict. c.100, s.57 said, “Whoever being married, shall marry any

other person during the life of the former husband or wife shall be guilty of felony” with a proviso saying that “nothing in this Act shall extend to any person marrying a

second time whose husband or wife shall have been continually absent from such person for the space of seven years last past, and shall not have been known by such

person to be living within that time.”

14 See R v K [2002] 1 AC 462. 15 Ibid., p.414. 16 Fong Chin Yue, ante., at 200, line 29-37; Mak Chuen Hing, ante, at para. 463E-F, 465B. 17 (2008) 11 HKCFAR 91, a case about ss.14(1) and 24 of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201. 18 [2002] 2 AC 545, 571. 19 Ibid., at para. 39. 20 For example, ss7(1)(b) & 26(3) of the Trade Description Ordinance, Cap. 36

香港的嚴格法律責任罪行有多嚴格    李運騰

引言

執法機關喜愛嚴格法律責任的罪行1，原因顯而易見。相對於須要證明全部犯罪心態的罪行，嚴格法律責任的罪行是更有效的執法工具。然而立法機關明

白，訂立嚴格法律責任的罪行，或會令沒有犯罪心態的人身陷囹圄。為減低其苛刻程度，立法機關往往同時訂立一些免責辯護的條文，而將證明這些辯護的

責任放在被告身上2。

終審法院就幸凌宇一案作出判決前的情況

某項罪行的犯罪心態的推定(presumption of     mens       rea)是否被移除，是關乎法例詮釋的問題。過往香港在嚴格法律責任的罪行與須證明全部犯罪心態的罪行

之間，並沒有“中間落墨”的選擇。然而，在1994年，即《人權法案》3       

制定後3年，上訴法庭在律政司        訴    Fong        Chin Yue  &     Others一案4

中作出創先例

的判決，令這兩類罪行不再那麼庭徑分明。

Fong        Chin Yue一案是由控方藉案件呈述提出的上訴，該案涉及根據《應課稅品條例》(第109章)第17條5     提出的控罪。上訴法庭要處理的問題實則頗為狹

窄：(i)案件涉及的罪行是否嚴格法律責任的罪行，以致控方無須證明被告知悉有關貨品屬應課稅貨品；(ii)若是，該條文是否違反《人權法案》保障的無罪推

定；以及(iii)若是，違反《人權法案》的後果為何。然而，法庭藉此機會為香港的法理學引入    “中間落墨”的普通法免責辯護。法庭裁定控方無須證明被告

知悉貨品未有完稅，但被告如根據相對可能性的衡量準則，證明他有好的和足夠的理由相信《應課稅品條例》中關於該等貨品的規定已獲遵從，包括貨品已

經完稅，那麼即使他所信的是錯誤的，仍然可以此作為免責辯護。

Fong        Chin Yue一案的判決後果深遠6，並影響香港海關打擊非法處理應課稅品罪行的能力。為此，立法機關於1996年在《應課稅品條例》增訂了第17(11)

條，為的是使被告在普通法免責辯護之上，還須證明他已盡“合理的努力”，方可成功辯護。此法定免責辯護並非該條例所獨有，其他訂立嚴格法律責任罪

行的條例，也有運用相同的草擬技巧。法庭審理香港特別行政區        訴    何漢聰及其他人7     一案時，亦有考慮這種法定免責辯護的效力。該案涉及根據《版權條

例》(第528章)第118條提出檢控的侵犯版權罪行。上訴法庭胡國興副庭長宣讀判詞時表示8：

“假如法例把某項罪行定為嚴格法律責任的罪行，控方便無需按普通法的一般規定去證明被告有犯罪心態，但是誠實和合理信念

的普通法免責辯護便當適用，除非該法例的立法原意表明該項罪行是絕對法律責任的罪行。不過，若有關法例已為法定罪行訂明

若干免責辯護條款，則立法原意便不大可能容許被告人引用讓普通法的免責辯護。”(底線為本文所加)

這段判詞為案件的審理提供了可預測性，故此一直受到重視。不過，鑑於近期法律方面的發展，現在對這段判詞的意義須作點保留。

幸凌宇一案

2010年，終審法院在幸凌宇及另一人       訴    香港特別行政區9

一案中，對涉及犯罪心態推定的普通法原則，作出決定性的判決。根據終審法院常任法官李義的

判詞，以往在金門香港有限公司        訴    香港律政司10      

一案確立的普通法原則，現須修訂，並應該重新述明如下11︰

(a)    法例用語︰法院首要考慮的問題，是犯罪意圖的推定有沒有被移除。法例或會使用例如“明知”或“疏忽地”等副詞，或使用能夠／不能夠帶有被告

的意識或標示被告心態的動詞或名詞。

(b)   罪行性質及標的物︰罪行的懲罰和受社會非議的程度愈嚴重，法院裁定犯罪心態的推定被移除的可能性便愈低。

(c)    屬規管性的罪行︰對於這些罪行，法庭一般毋須對移除上述推定過於顧忌，典型例子包括公眾衞生、發牌及工業法例所訂明的罪行。假如存在中間落

墨的選擇，則移除推定很可能會導致法院採取居中基準，審理該等罪行。

(d)   立法目的：假如法庭考慮了罪行性質和目標，認為若把條文詮釋為需確立全部的犯罪心態，會使檢控難以成功，以致有違立法目的，那麼法庭便須給

予立法目的。假如立法目的是合理的考慮因素，法庭便很可能會採納法律居中基準，以符合立法的本意。

(e)    其他選擇：假如法庭已按上文所述，經多方考慮法例的用語及目的，移除了犯罪心態的推定，便可進一步考慮以下的選擇：

                (i)   假如被告能按相對可能性衡量準則證明他在進行受禁行為時誠實和合理地相信相關情況存在，而假如該等情況確實存在的話，他便不會有罪，

那麼被告可以此作為免責辯護(法律責任居中基準)；

                (ii)  限制被告只能倚賴法例對有關控罪所訂明的免責條文所指定的心態作為免責辯護(豁除性的法定免責辯護)；或

                (iii) 裁定控罪屬絕對法律責任的罪行，只要證明被告曾作出或導致犯罪行為，則不論其心態為何，均判罪名成立(絕對法律責任)。

幸凌宇一案的其他爭論點

然而，幸凌宇一案還涉及兩個值得進一步討論的爭論點：

(q)   法例若訂有免責辯護，則法院何時可據此豁除“中間落墨”的普通法免責辯護；以及

(b)   憲法問題會否及如何影響犯罪意圖推定的處理方法。

豁除性的法定免責辯護

常任法官李義沒有排除普通法免責辯護與法定免責辯護之間沒有“抵觸”時，兩者可並用的可能性。因此，現時不能說，假如法例就嚴格法律責任罪行訂有

免責辯護，被告便很不可能引用“中間落墨”的普通法免責辯護。常任法官李義限定了Ho      Hon Chun       Danel一案的適用範圍，他並指出：

“95.       (原審)法官無疑考慮到法定免責辯護與並存的普通法免責辯護有抵觸的情況，因為他指出，在該案中，法定免責辯護與誠實

及合理信念的普通法免責辯護有所“重疊”。”

常任法官稍後繼續表示12：

“164.     關鍵問題是，經妥當詮釋的法定免責辯護，與第三個選擇的存在是否有抵觸。若有，則只可倚賴法定免責辯護。”

至於什麼情況可視為有抵觸，根據幸凌宇一案所得的指引如下：

(a)    法例訂明的免責辯護如涵蓋不同事實，而且比誠實及合理信念的免責辯護的涵蓋面更廣，兩者便沒有抵觸13；   以及

(b)   法例訂明的免責辯護如有額外規定，便清楚表明立法原意是誠實及合理信念並不足夠14。

憲法問題

常任法官李義在幸凌宇一案的判詞的開頭加了一個備註，表示鑑於該案不涉及憲法問題，他的論據純粹建基於普通法原則15。

不過，憲法問題對犯罪意圖推定的普通法原則有否影響及有多大影響，卻難以確定。這是因為有一系列相關案例顯示，鑑於法院釐定某條懲罰性條文的真正

涵義時採用的詮釋規則，包含大量的人權元素，假如法院是經過詮釋過程才得出某項法定罪行屬嚴格法律責任罪行的結論，那麼制定有關罪行的法定條文便

毫無疑問地不會抵觸《人權法案》16。    這系列案例認為，法院決定某一法定罪行行的犯罪意圖推定是否已被移除時，只考慮普通法原則便已足夠。另一方面，有另一系列案例則顯示，每當法院決定某事項是否構成罪行的要素或須由辯方舉證時，須參照人權方面的法律。在香港特別行政區        訴 吳保安17

一案，法院引述並贊同Lord        Steyn在  R      v      Lambert  &     Others一案中所提出的下述意見18：

“有關罪行的構成因素與免責辯護問題的區分，有時既欠原則，又流於武斷。歸根結底，這有時只是採用哪種草擬技巧的問題：

一項罪行的構成因素，可從它的定義中移走，並將之塑造成免責辯護、而某罪行的定義則可重新界定，以涵蓋所有可能的免責辯

護。我們有需要專注實質，而非技術問題或按字面咬文嚼字。”

在吳保安一案，常任法官李義指出19：

“因此，問題的癥結，並不是被告須證明的最終事實是涉及可視為罪行的主要元素還是免責辯護的事宜，而是其實質影響：該法

律條文會否使被告在關鍵問題存有合理疑點的情況下，仍有被定罪的可能？”(底線為本文所加)

其中一種嚴格法律責任的罪行可能涉及憲法問題的情況在於辯方有舉證的責任，證明被告沒有犯罪心態，藉此作為辯護的理由20。法庭會如何處理以上兩個

不同系列的案例之間的明顯矛盾，仍有待驗證。

儘管終審法院已以頗為全面的方式處理嚴格法律責任的罪行的問題，但相信這法律範疇仍存在不少議題有待關注和解決。

停牌令遲出半年 西醫申覆核修正

(明報) 2013年01月10日

【明報專訊】西醫幸凌宇2006年向多名病童處方含酒精咳藥水，以及因銷售未經註冊藥物被醫委會罰停牌1年。醫委會較原定時間延遲逾半年刊憲停牌令，遭幸凌宇司法覆核。雙方昨同意經法庭命令，修正停牌令生效日期，幸凌宇短期內將可申請復牌。

法官林文瀚昨宣布與訟雙方同意，法庭修訂去年9月14日刊憲及生效的停牌令，改為去年3月7日起執行，1年停牌令於本年3月7日屆滿。醫委會須支付幸的訟費。

幸凌宇申請司法覆核時指出，2011年3月被醫委會命令停牌1年，去年1月他被駁回上訴。法例規定醫委會須在案結後1個月將判決刊憲，令停牌令生效。幸凌宇去年8月發現自己仍為註冊醫生，多番去信會方查詢，至去年9月14日醫委會才回覆稱，停牌令已於同日刊憲並生效。幸凌宇認為停牌期被無故延長遂提司法覆核。

【案件編號：HCAL159/12】