Coram: Peter Hui Esq. Ct 2
Date : 13.7.2006
Case Ref.: TMS 2730-2734/2006
Offence: D1 D2 : one count of procuring the application
of a false trade description to goods outside Hong Kong
D2D3 &D4 : One count of importing goods to which a
false trade description was applied
Defence : D1-D2
represented by Mr. Eric Kwok SC P/L
D3-D4
represented by Mr Colin Wright P/L
Verdict : No Case to answer all summonses. All summonses
dismissed
Disposal of exhibits : Save as to P6 to be returned to
D-4 and P12-12A to D-1 P5-P11 and P15-P27 are to be returned to C&E
department. Rest to be retained in court file.
Brief Notes of Proceedings
1.Prosecution case in relation to facts : facts admitted
by virtue of S.65C
2.Prosecution evidence : all as set out in the exhibit
list prepared by the C& E Dept were produced and marked as exhibits following
the same nomenclature. Specifically this included 2 shirts bearing “Daniel Hechter Paris” being
samples of the infringing articles and 5 cautioned statements
Matters of law relied upon
and brought up to the Court by the Prosecution relating to the threshold issue
: whether the infringing articles (exhibit 12, 12A) being as they were before the court would be
considered as False Trade Description within the meaning of Cap 362.
A. s.2 (b) under “false
trade description” defines it can be meant as “ a trade description which,
though not false, is misleading, that is to say, likely to be taken for such an
indication of any of the matters specified in the defintion of “trade
description” as would be false to a material degree
B. s.6(1)(c) “A person
applies a trade description ... if he uses the trade description .... in any
manner likely to be taken as referring to the goods
C.The English case
Divisional Trading Officer v. Kingsley Clothing Ltd [1989] which suggested
the various stages of correct approach
to consider the issue of False Trade Description was before the court first
brought up by the Mr.Eric Kwok SC in his
No Case to Answer submission. This was expressly endorsed by the Prosecution in
reply.
D.The Prosecution cited R v Tam Sho Lam [1988] 2 HKLR 586 as
authority and asked the Court ruling against the defendants. This was based on
similar facts “Giggles London” and “Daniel Hechter Paris”. The word “Paris” on
the label of exhibit 12 , 12 A in the submission by the Prosecution was
referable a geographical location enough to mislead an intending buyer. The
Prosecution expressly invited the Court
to direct its mind to apply the objective test as suggested by Bewley J.
The Court once remarked this case was decided a while back and asked if there
was any new relevant case. The Prosecution conceded this decision was made 18
years ago, however, this was still good law and still cited with approval as
recently as 2006
3.Prosecution Case : The
manufacturing processes as set out in the admitted facts i.e. Mainland China
and Hong Kong with the seized 1,200 shirts samples of which were before the
court as exhibits 12,12A bearing the
lables designed and produced in such manner i.e. “Daniel Hechter Paris”
was in breach of s. 7(1)(b) Cap 362 in
the circumstances
The issue before the court
It was the duty of the court
to decide ( based on the facts and evidence adduced whether the seized 1,200
shirts bearing such a logo/label) whether “Daniel Hechter Paris “ was a False
Trade Description.within the meaning as set out in s.2 of Cap 362. In assessing
the evidence the court has to bear in mind a False Trade Description includes a
trade description though not false, is misleading to a material degree.
Defence No Case to Answer
Submission
1.Mr. Kwok SC brifely
outlined the English case Divisional Trading Officer v. Kingsley Clothing Ltd
[1989] and the various stages said to be the correct approaches to determine
the issue.
2.He said the case of R v Tam Sho Lam [1988] 2 HKLR 586 was just
limited to its own facts and was not helpful in the present case
3.Without further discussion
of law and facts he floated around some famous brand names and he took some
liberty to download some images from the internet and showed to the court. A
copy of which had been supplied to the Prosecution.
4.Briefly he contended the
way the world as we now lived had gone a long way since 18 years ago. People
perception changed
5.He sought strong reliance
on the case of KTS/9452-55 /2001 involving the same facts and D1 as defendant.
This the court ruled in favour of the defendant. He asked the present court to
follow the same verdict. (Neither the relevant Notes of Proceedings nor the
Reasons for Sentence were accessible by the present prosecution counsel on
fiat. The details were not discussed in court in the present case.) As such the
prosecution could make no comment nor could offer an explanation/reply.
6.Mr. Wright endosrsed what
had been said by Mr. Kwok SC. On top of this he also downloaded some trade
marks images as registered in HK from the internet for the Court reference.
(copy of which was at float )
7.The Prosecution in reply
stated “trade marks” are different from “trade descriptions” and that the
statutes had cast a very wide net. The addresses were on adopting the correct
approach as set out in Divisional Trading Officer v. Kingsley Clothing Ltd
[1989]. The case of R v Tam Sho Lam
[1988] 2 HKLR 586 was discussed.
Court 's Verdict
It was a brief one.
1.Having considered relevant
interpretation and definition sections, submission by Defence and Prosecution ,
authorities and materials placed before it, this Court ruled the defendants did
not have a case to answer. All summonses were dismissed
2.Regarding whether
prospective purchasers might be mislead, there were no evidence to assist the
court in relation to the price and market.
3.In coming to this
conclusion, the court shared the same view of the judge in the summons under
reference KTS/9452-55.
Application for Review under
s. 104 Magistrates Ordinance (cap.227)
1.The Prosecution should
apply to the learned magistrate for a review of his determination within 14
days of the original determination(i.e. 13.7.2006).
2.Regardless of what had
been decided in KTS/9452-55 there was strong primac facie case against the defendants
after the close of the Prosecution case.
3.Apparently the Court did
not follow the correct approaches as set out by Lord Bingham in Divisional
Trading Officer v. Kingsley Clothing Ltd [1989] in evaluating facts and
evidence relating to issue of False Trade Descriptions
4.The Gailbraith test
“requires defence counsel to address their minds, in making a submission, as to
whether there is evidence to establish each and every element of the offence(s)
before the court”1 All Defence Counsels submissions were confined to the
threshold issue. Therefore this also limited the scope of the Prosecution's
reply.
5.In deciding the issue
:whether there is a misleading trade description which is false to a material
degree, the Court failed to apply the objective test as set out in Bewley J in
the case of Tam Sho Lam 1988 in determining whether an anticipated market was
likely to be misled. In saying there was no evidence relating to the price and
market to assist him, obviously the learned magistrate
took no notice to the market
value of the seizure as stated in the Admitted Facts submitted under S.65C.
Even granted in the unlikely circumstances there were not such evidence, as had
been
rightly pointed out by
McMahon, J in HKSAR v Lai Wing Hung & others (Magistracy Appeal no 1111 of
2005) the objective test in the case of Tam Sho Lam was not the only test, the
Court
needed to use a common sense
approach. In this regard, this present Court had not tried to decide upon this
very issue
The Award of Defence Costs
1.Upon acquitting the
Defendants, the Court awarded Costs to the Defence, taxed if not agreed.
2.Prosecution replied the
accused 's own conduct had brought suspicion on themselves.
Further Remarks
1.The Admitted Facts were
produced with the parts relating to matters of law excised.
2.Those parts in the facts
admitted relating to the D3-4 were changed at the instigation of the Defence.
The Prosecution had addressed the Court over the confession of D3-4 in the
relevant cautioned statements as to the failure of due diligence on the part of
the D3-4
巴黎名店不等於法國製造 ◎黃覺岸
大 家都應當知道,若然一件貨品之上載有虛假的商品說明,那是會觸犯〈商品說明條例〉。我們購買貴價物品之時,也往往會加上一些產地來源的形容詞,例如「法國 貨」、「美國貨」、「日本貨」等等,以示貨品是有高品質。香港人也明白,就是「香港製造」的成衣產品,也曾經是外國人心目之中的高價貨,有品質保證的標 誌,絕不失禮。
但今時今日,地球已經一體化,在甚麼地方製造,是不是最重要?例如最暢銷的美 國球鞋大家都知道是在巴西製造,而今天的中國有「世界工廠」的美譽,很多世界名牌貨品的生產地方是在中國。一件法國名牌的恤衫,不說明在甚麼地方製造,但 只標明「巴黎」二字,算是觸犯了〈商品說明條例〉嗎?
HKSAR V SUNAN Industries Ltd
& Anor [2008] 2HKC 125
這 是一件刑事案件,被告從中國內地入口一批1200件上面標示著「Daniel Hechter, Paris」的襯衫,被告被指違反〈商品說明條例〉,有關的標籤被指誤導消費者產品是來自法國巴黎所製造。這是一個法律問題,還是只是一個簡單的事實問 題?一個在香港的一般購物者,會否因為標籤上的巴黎Paris字眼,就會將襯衫當成是在法國製造,亦因而被誤導嗎?裁判官的判決是被告的罪名不成立。政府 於是到高等法院原訟庭上訴。
法律觀點與事實的確認都在同一點上,就是一個普通的購物者或顧客 (Shopper),在沒有甚麼專門知識的情況下,會否認為衣服上的標籤,是正在指示出生產襯衫的來源地。法庭認為沒有香港的陪審員(假設有陪審員的審理 情況下,而陪審員代表一般人的見解,因為陪審員亦是來自一般人)會合理地認同情況是這樣。
今 時今日,法官認為很多外國牌子是在中國製造的情況,已是一種常識。有關的標籤可能會帶來剎那間的初步錯覺(Fleeting First Impression),以為是法國製造,但這不等於已經傳達了一個不正確的事實,只要花時間想一想,顧客就會明白標籤上所指的是時裝店(Fashion House)是在巴黎,而非在巴黎製造,所以不構成誤導。在香港購物的遊客,亦應會有同樣認知,不易被誤導。
法官親自檢視這批襯衫的樣本,認為品質一流,明顯不會與市面上小店所售的假冒次貨混為一式。這批是典型與及保守的悠閒裝(Smart Casual),只會在悠閒店出售,價錢為六百港元左右一件。
時代已變,商品的設計與質量已經不會與生產的地方掛鉤。合理的香港顧客亦是不會有這樣的預期。襯衫的標籤(Hechter Daniel)只代表設計與品質,生產的地方是沒有所謂的。
控方特別指出一點,香港有很多平價的旅遊團,參加者可能知識與教育水平不高,因而受誤導。法官極為懷疑這一情況的可能性,但就算有,這些顧客同樣不是以產地作為購買與不買的考慮。◇
Trade
description/Shirts bearing the label ‘Daniel Hechter,
Paris ’/Label not likely to
be taken to indicate Parisian or
French manufacture/Label not
an indication of place of
manufacture/ Label an
indication of location of fashion house
商品說明 – 恤衫附有
‘Daniel Hechter, Paris’ 的
標籤 – 標籤相當不可能被當作是顯示在巴黎或法
國製造 – 標籤並不顯示製造地方 – 標籤顯示時裝
店位處地點
MA 939/2007
(1) Sunan Industries Ltd
(2) Shine Ning Garments Ltd
This was an appeal by way of
case stated against an order
made by a magistrate
dismissing informations under the Trade
Description Ordinance, Cap
362, upon his finding that there was
no case to answer in respect
of any of them.
The undisputed facts of the
Appellant’s case were that the
Respondents had involved
themselves in causing 1,200 shirts to be
manufactured in China, and
imported into Hong Kong, bearing the
label in the collar ‘Daniel
Hechter, Paris ’.
The question posed by the
case stated for the opinion of the
High Court was: could, may
or might a properly directed juror find
on the evidence that the
label, ‘Daniel Hechter, Paris ’, was
anything likely to be taken
as an indication of the place of
manufacture of the shirt to
which it was attached. The evidence
related to the question
extended no further than the fact that the
shirts bore the labels.
There was no direct evidence indicating the
price at which a shirt was
to be sold, or in what sort of shop. It
was not suggested that these
shirts were fakes in the sense that
they were not genuine Daniel
Hechter shirts.
It was common ground that a
properly directed juror in the
case would be directed: (a)
that in considering the question posed
they must consider what
indication a Hong Kong shopper for such
goods would take; and (b)
that if it was reasonably possible that
some Hong Kong shoppers
might take the label as an indication of
the place of manufacture
that would be sufficient to establish the
prosecution case, even
though many more Hong Kong shoppers
might in fact take the
opposite view.
The shirts were of good
quality. They were the sort of shirts
that would attract the
descriptions, mainstream, fairly
conservative, smart casual.
The Appellant submitted that they
would not be out of place in
a relatively smart shop in Hong Kong
at a price of $600 or so.The
question engaged what a modern day juror would think
about what the modern day
shopper would make of the label.
Held :
(1) The magistrate was of
the view that no properly directed
jury could find that the
label indicated a place of manufacture, and
he was right. Times had
changed. The representation in such
labels these days told the
shopper that the design and the quality
control of the government
was associated with a particular place in
question. A properly
directed juror could never be sure that a
Hong Kong shopper was likely
to take such a label as the place of
manufacture;
(2) The plain, general
knowledge amongst those minded to buy
a Daniel Hechter shirt,
particularly in Hong Kong, was such that
the label would not likely
be taken to indicate Parisian or French
manufacture;
(3) Although the Trade
Descriptions Ordinance must be given a
fair and liberal
interpretation, promoting its objectives, which
included providing a
safeguard to members of the public who were
consumers and purchasers of
goods, and to Hong Kong’s
reputation as an
international trading and shopping centre, the
word ‘Paris ’ beneath a
designer’s name on a shirt label was likely
to be taken as an indication
as to where the design and quality
control emanated, and not
where the shirt was manufactured. It
described the place where
Daniel Hechter was situated;
(4) The general public were
not ignorant of the fact that fashion
houses in London, Paris, New
York and the like caused their
garments to be manufactured
in China. Globalisation of trade and
manufacture was not a
secret. Country of origin was no longer the
powerful indicator of
quality that once it was. If the Appellant
was right then they would
have an ordinary shopper contemplating
those capital cities as
being the sites of enormous manufacturing
endeavour, for they claimed
that the label might be taken as an
indication that it was
Paris, and not France, that was the place of
manufacture;
(5) The Hong Kong shopper
would include the tourist. Tourists
minded to buy Daniel Hechter
shirts in Hong Kong were not likely
to regard Paris as being the
home of the factory as opposed to the
fashion house from a perusal
of the shirt label, even if they came
across the shirt in an
expensive shop here. Although cheap
package tours might attract
those of a more limited intellect and
general knowledge, such a
person, in the unlikely event of his
being in the market for a
shirt like this, would be so indifferent to the place of manufacture that he
would not take the word ‘Paris’
as an indication of it;
(6) In contemplating what
indication Hong Kong shoppers
would take from the label,
there was a difference between what
might be a fleeting, first
impression and something that could be
said to be ‘taken as ’ an
indication of a fact. A moment’s thought
would reveal that the word
‘Paris ’ in this context was likely to be
taken by the shopper as no
more than an indication of the location
of the fashion house, and
that it was unlikely to be taken as the
place of manufacture;
(7) No Hong Kong juror could
now sensibly contemplate that
the Hong Kong shopper might
be likely to take the word ‘Paris’
on this label as an
indication of the place of manufacture.
Result - Appeal dismissed.
HCMA
939/2007
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
MAGISTRACY APPEAL NO. 939 OF 2007
(ON APPEAL FROM TMS 2730 to 2734 OF 2006 (CONSOLIDATED))
____________
BETWEEN
HKSAR Appellant
and
SUNAN
INDUSTRIES LIMITED 1st
Respondent
SHINE
NING GARMENTS LIMITED 2nd
Respondent
____________
Before: Deputy High Court Judge Line in Court
Date of Hearing: 29
January 2008
Date of Judgment:
6 February 2008
_______________
J U D G M E N T
_______________
1.
This is an appeal by way of
case stated against an order made by a magistrate, Mr Peter Hui, dismissing informations
under the Trade Descriptions Ordinance Cap 362 preferred against the two
respondents upon his finding that there was no case to answer in respect of any
of them.
2.
There was no dispute concerning
the facts of the appellant’s case. The
respondents had involved themselves in causing 1200 shirts to be manufactured
in China, and imported into Hong Kong, bearing the label in the collar ‘Daniel
Hechter, Paris’.
3.
The resolution of one question
determines the result of this appeal. Both
sides agree that the question is this: could, may or might a properly directed
juror find on the evidence that the label, ‘Daniel Hechter, Paris’, was
anything likely to be taken as an indication of the place of manufacture of the
shirt to which it was attached.
4.
It is also common ground that a properly directed juror in
the case would be directed:
(a) that in considering the question posed they must consider what
indication a Hong Kong shopper for such goods would take; and
(b) that if it is reasonably possible that some Hong Kong shoppers might take the
label as an indication of the place of manufacture that would be sufficient to
establish the prosecution’s case, even though many more Hong Kong
shoppers might in fact take the opposite view.
5.
The evidence relevant to the
question extended no further than the fact that the shirts bore the labels. There was no direct evidence indicating the
price at which a shirt was to be sold, or in what sort of shop. There was no suggestion that these shirts
were fakes in the sense that they were not genuine Daniel Hechter shirts.
6.
The magistrate saw samples of
the shirts and I have seen them. They
are of good quality. No one disputes
that. They are not the sort of articles
that would be sold very cheaply from stalls in markets. They are the sort of shirt that would attract
the descriptions, mainstream, fairly conservative, smart casual. The appellant submitted convincingly that
they would not be out of place in a relatively smart shop in Hong Kong at a
price of 600 dollars or so.
7.
The question engages what a modern
day juror would think about what the modern day shopper would make of the label.
8.
The magistrate was of the view
that no properly directed jury could find that the label indicated a place of
manufacture.
9.
I agree with him. Times have changed. The representation implicit in such labels
these days tells the shopper that the design and the quality control of the garment
is associated with a particular place in question. A properly directed juror could never be sure
that a Hong Kong shopper was likely to take such a label as an indication of
the place of manufacture.
10.
My view attributes no
specialist knowledge to the ordinary shopper, because I judge that plain
general knowledge amongst those minded to buy a Daniel Hechter shirt, particularly
in Hong Kong, is such that the label would not likely be taken to indicate
Parisian or French manufacture.
11.
I do not forget that the Trade
Descriptions Ordinance must be given a fair and liberal interpretation, promoting
its objectives, which include providing a safeguard to members of the public
who are consumers and purchasers of goods, and to Hong Kong’s international
reputation as an international trading and shopping centre.
12.
However, I judge that the word
Paris beneath a designer’s name on a shirt label is likely to be taken as an
indication as to where the design and quality control emanates, and not where
the shirt was manufactured. It describes
the place where Daniel Hechter is situated.
13.
Thus, for instance, the labels
of Donna Karan, New York, or Dunhill, London, tell the prospective purchaser
that their clothing will be up to the standards associated with those
names. The prospective purchaser of
their garments would thereby expect them to meet their standards in design and
quality, but would be indifferent as to the location of the factory that
actually made the garment. This view
merely acknowledges that the general public are not ignorant of the fact that
fashion houses in London, Paris, New York and the like cause their garments to
be manufactured in China. Globalisation
of trade and manufacture is not a secret.
Country of origin is no longer the powerful indicator of quality that it
once was. If the appellant is right then
they would have an ordinary shopper contemplating those capital cities as being
the sites of enormous manufacturing endeavour, for they claim that the label
may be taken as an indication that it is Paris, and not France, that is the
place of manufacture. Of course it is
possible that a few Hong Kong shoppers might take the view that the label did
indicate Parisian manufacture, but in my judgment that is not reasonably
possible. What Hong Kong shopper is
ignorant of the factory outlet or the reduced price overrun in respect of
genuine garments that are associated by their labels with Europe and the USA? Who among them would reasonably think that
such garments had been manufactured on those continents and shipped here for
such sales?
14.
Mr Turnbull rightly points out
that the Hong Kong shopper will include the tourist. Tourists minded to buy Daniel Hechter shirts
in Hong Kong are not in my judgment likely to regard Paris as being the home of
the factory as opposed to the fashion house from a perusal of the shirt label, even
if they came across the shirt in an expensive shop here. He made the point that cheap package tours may
attract those of a more limited intellect and general knowledge such that they
may likely take the label as indicating the place of manufacture. I have grave doubts whether that is likely, but
believe the point to be met by the consideration that such a person, in the
unlikely event of his being in the market for a shirt like this, would be so
indifferent as to the place of manufacture that he would not take the word
Paris as an indication of it.
15.
In contemplating what
indication Hong Kong shoppers would take from the label, I perceive there to be
a difference between what may be a fleeting, first impression and something
that can be said to be ‘taken as’ an indication of a fact. Construing the term I hope in a common sense
way involves the shopper giving the matter a moment’s thought. A moment’s thought would reveal that the word
Paris in this context was likely to be taken by the shopper as no more than an
indication of the location of the fashion house and that it was unlikely to be
taken as the place of manufacture.
16.
On the decisive point I agree
with the magistrate that no Hong Kong juror could now sensibly contemplate that
the Hong Kong shopper may be likely to take the word ‘Paris’ on this label as
an indication of the place of manufacture.
17.
Accordingly the appeal is
dismissed. Without contention, the
respondents shall have their costs to be taxed if not agreed.
(Peter
Line)
Deputy
High Court Judge
Mr R G Turnbull, Senior Assistant
Director of Public Prosecutions & Mr Hayson Tse, Senior Government
Counsel of the Department of Justice, for the Appellant
Mr Eric Kowk, S.C. and Mr C Y Li,
instructed by Simon Siu, Wong, Lam & Chan, for the 1st & 2nd
Respondents
Tam So Nam extract
1. The appellant was convicted on two summonses of
applying a false trade description to 3,450
ladies dresses and importing the same, contrary to sections 7(1)(a) (i)
and 12(l) respectively of the Trade Descriptions Ordinance, Cap. 362.
2. The trade description was on the dress labels,
which contained the words "Giggles London". The first word of the
logo was in large red lettering, whereas 'London' was in small black print on
top and to the right.
3. The appellant owns a small trading company in
Tsuen Wan. He does not understand English. In June 1986, his firm entered into
an agreement with the English patent holder, Carrogold Ltd., under which he was
authorised to use the logo on garments to be sold in Hong Kong.
4. The appellant placed an order for a quantity of
dresses to be manufactured in a factory in China. He himself took the labels to
China, where they were attached to the dresses. On importation into Hong Kong
in November, 1986, they were seized by the Customs. There was no mark on the
garments to indicate they had been made in China.
5. The market value of the consignment is admitted
to be $53,000 and the appellant anticipated a profit of $2,000.
6. Under section 2(1) of the Trade Desoriptions
Ordinance, a 'false trade description' means, inter alias, "a trade
description which, though not false, is misleading, that is to say, likely to
be taken for such an indication of any of the matters specified in the
definition of 'trade description' or, as such an indication, would be false to
a material degree".
7. One of the matters specified in the definition
of 'trade description' in the same section is 'place or date of manufacture,
production, processing or reconditioning'
8. The prosecution case was that the label was
likely to be taken for an indication that the dresses were made in London and
was thereby misleading and a false trade description accordingly.
9. It is highly relevant that the dresses are of
poor quality, shoddily made and expected to sell for only $11-12 and also that
the anticipated market was Filipina maids, whose knowledge and judgment
concerning the origin of such garments may be less than that of the other
English-speaking inhabitants of the territory. The test as to whether they were
likely to be so misled is an objective one.
10. The evidence in support of the prosecution case
was admitted under section 65C of the Criminal Procedure Ordinances, Cap. 221.
The appellant gave evidence and produced a letter and two telexes from
Carrogold.
11. The Crown relied on A. G. v. Ikeda
international (H.K.) Ltd.(1) in that case Takane Japan' was held to be a false
trade description. I agree with Mr Sakhrani, for the appellant, as did the
magistrate, that Ikeda can be distinguished from the present case, on the basic
that, in that case, the issue was whether clock movements had undergone
treatment or processing in China to such an extent that they could be said to
have been manufactured in China. The significance of the expression
"Takane Japan" was not considered.
12. The appellant gave contradictory evidence as to
his purpose in using these labels. In chief he said it was in order to attract
purchasers in the local market in cross-examination he denied that. The
magistrate found him to be inconsistent and evasive.
13. The magistrate has written a comprehensive and
helpful Statement of Findings.
14. That the appellant had permission from
Carrogold to use the label was, in the magistrate's opinion, irrelevant. She
also discounted the the fact that Carrogold itself had never been prosecutes in
England.
15. Her conclusion was :-
"Adopting a common sense approach. I found
'Giggles, LONDON' a false trade description in that it, though not a trade
description, was likely to be taken for an indication of the place of manufacture
and as such an indication, it was false to a material degree as it was not
disputed that the ladies' dresses were wholly made in China. In arriving at the
finding, I did not need the assistance of expert evidence or evidence of a
member of the public that he would be misled."
16. Mr Sakhrani complains that she has not said why
she formed this opinion of the label. He submits that it is not enough simply
to reject the defence case; the prosecution should lead evidence, from which
the magistrate can infer that a reasonable prospective purchaser eras likely to
be misled.
17. Mr. Sakhrani relies on Donnelly v. Rowlands(2)
in which Lord Parker, C.J. said at page 12:-
"If there had been a finding supported by
evidence that members of the public had been misled ............ then there
would be some grounds for saying there was a false trade description."
18. In Williamson v. Tierney(3) the magistrate
found that the term. English lever" was a false trade description, on the
basis of evidence to that effect rather than as a matter of law. It was held on
appeal that the court could not interfere with his decision.
19. In Kingeton-upon-Thames v. FW Woolworth &
Co. Ltd.(4), it was held that evidence of trade practice was admissible to
decide the issue, where the description was not unequivocally false.
20. I agree that evidence of trade practice, and
indeed that of prospective purchasers, would have been admissible. I also agree
that the magistrate must base her decision on evidence. Here, however, there
was evidence, namely that the dress itself,
its price and prospective market, together with that of the label. As counsel for the Crown points out, it is a
simple item and there is no need for the prosecution to call evidence to
resolve technical complexities, as in the cases cited by Mr Sakhrani.
21. Counsel complains that the magistrate has
failed to examine the label adequately, or to make allowances for the fact that
the word "London" does not stand out. At page 6 of her Statement of
Findings she specifically notes that "London" was in black and much
smaller in size than 'Giggles'". There is no substance in this criticism.
22. I am satisfied there was sufficient evidence
before the magistrate on which to base her decision. I a am also satisfied she
applied the correct test. it was open to
the magistrate to come to the conclusion that the label was misleading. She has
not erred in law and I cannot say her decision was manifestly wrong. For these
reasons the appeal against conviction is
dismissed.
Tam So Nam extract
1. The appellant was convicted on two summonses of
applying a false trade description to 3,450
ladies dresses and importing the same, contrary to sections 7(1)(a) (i)
and 12(l) respectively of the Trade Descriptions Ordinance, Cap. 362.
2. The trade description was on the dress labels,
which contained the words "Giggles London". The first word of the
logo was in large red lettering, whereas 'London' was in small black print on
top and to the right.
3. The appellant owns a small trading company in
Tsuen Wan. He does not understand English. In June 1986, his firm entered into
an agreement with the English patent holder, Carrogold Ltd., under which he was
authorised to use the logo on garments to be sold in Hong Kong.
4. The appellant placed an order for a quantity of
dresses to be manufactured in a factory in China. He himself took the labels to
China, where they were attached to the dresses. On importation into Hong Kong
in November, 1986, they were seized by the Customs. There was no mark on the
garments to indicate they had been made in China.
5. The market value of the consignment is admitted
to be $53,000 and the appellant anticipated a profit of $2,000.
6. Under section 2(1) of the Trade Desoriptions
Ordinance, a 'false trade description' means, inter alias, "a trade
description which, though not false, is misleading, that is to say, likely to
be taken for such an indication of any of the matters specified in the
definition of 'trade description' or, as such an indication, would be false to
a material degree".
7. One of the matters specified in the definition
of 'trade description' in the same section is 'place or date of manufacture,
production, processing or reconditioning'
8. The prosecution case was that the label was
likely to be taken for an indication that the dresses were made in London and
was thereby misleading and a false trade description accordingly.
9. It is highly relevant that the dresses are of
poor quality, shoddily made and expected to sell for only $11-12 and also that
the anticipated market was Filipina maids, whose knowledge and judgment
concerning the origin of such garments may be less than that of the other
English-speaking inhabitants of the territory. The test as to whether they were
likely to be so misled is an objective one.
10. The evidence in support of the prosecution case
was admitted under section 65C of the Criminal Procedure Ordinances, Cap. 221.
The appellant gave evidence and produced a letter and two telexes from
Carrogold.
11. The Crown relied on A. G. v. Ikeda
international (H.K.) Ltd.(1) in that case Takane Japan' was held to be a false
trade description. I agree with Mr Sakhrani, for the appellant, as did the
magistrate, that Ikeda can be distinguished from the present case, on the basic
that, in that case, the issue was whether clock movements had undergone
treatment or processing in China to such an extent that they could be said to
have been manufactured in China. The significance of the expression
"Takane Japan" was not considered.
12. The appellant gave contradictory evidence as to
his purpose in using these labels. In chief he said it was in order to attract
purchasers in the local market in cross-examination he denied that. The
magistrate found him to be inconsistent and evasive.
13. The magistrate has written a comprehensive and
helpful Statement of Findings.
14. That the appellant had permission from
Carrogold to use the label was, in the magistrate's opinion, irrelevant. She
also discounted the the fact that Carrogold itself had never been prosecutes in
England.
15. Her conclusion was :-
"Adopting a common sense approach. I found
'Giggles, LONDON' a false trade description in that it, though not a trade
description, was likely to be taken for an indication of the place of manufacture
and as such an indication, it was false to a material degree as it was not
disputed that the ladies' dresses were wholly made in China. In arriving at the
finding, I did not need the assistance of expert evidence or evidence of a
member of the public that he would be misled."
16. Mr Sakhrani complains that she has not said why
she formed this opinion of the label. He submits that it is not enough simply
to reject the defence case; the prosecution should lead evidence, from which
the magistrate can infer that a reasonable prospective purchaser eras likely to
be misled.
17. Mr. Sakhrani relies on Donnelly v. Rowlands(2)
in which Lord Parker, C.J. said at page 12:-
"If there had been a finding supported by
evidence that members of the public had been misled ............ then there
would be some grounds for saying there was a false trade description."
18. In Williamson v. Tierney(3) the magistrate
found that the term. English lever" was a false trade description, on the
basis of evidence to that effect rather than as a matter of law. It was held on
appeal that the court could not interfere with his decision.
19. In Kingeton-upon-Thames v. FW Woolworth &
Co. Ltd.(4), it was held that evidence of trade practice was admissible to
decide the issue, where the description was not unequivocally false.
20. I agree that evidence of trade practice, and
indeed that of prospective purchasers, would have been admissible. I also agree
that the magistrate must base her decision on evidence. Here, however, there
was evidence, namely that the dress itself,
its price and prospective market, together with that of the label. As counsel for the Crown points out, it is a
simple item and there is no need for the prosecution to call evidence to
resolve technical complexities, as in the cases cited by Mr Sakhrani.
21. Counsel complains that the magistrate has
failed to examine the label adequately, or to make allowances for the fact that
the word "London" does not stand out. At page 6 of her Statement of
Findings she specifically notes that "London" was in black and much
smaller in size than 'Giggles'". There is no substance in this criticism.
22. I am satisfied there was sufficient evidence
before the magistrate on which to base her decision. I a am also satisfied she
applied the correct test. it was open to
the magistrate to come to the conclusion that the label was misleading. She has
not erred in law and I cannot say her decision was manifestly wrong. For these
reasons the appeal against conviction is
dismissed.
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